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The study performs an economic analysis of the rules that govern the organization of 
production within Prosecco cooperative wineries in the Treviso area, in order to assess the 
economic impact on the wineries performance and the ability of the institution to minimize 
transaction costs. We first present an economic discussion of qualitative and quantitative 
information gathered for the 16 cooperative wineries in the Treviso area. Then we present a 
theoretical framework for the economics of transaction costs of the cooperative wineries. 
Despite the “fame” of the cooperative winery  of  an  inefficient,  assistance-based  
institution,  it  emerges  the  profile  of  a  complex structure, which seeks to incorporate the 
values of social and cultural cohesion and competitiveness in the markets, within the mission 
of a company. There is a strong link between regulation of quality standards and impacts on 
the winery economic performance. In the case of the winery, achieving mutualism is 
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The production of Prosecco wine is mostly concentrated in a limited geographical area 
around the Treviso province, but is organized in very different ways and characterized by 
different governance structures (Rossetto et al., 2011; Boatto, Barisan, 2014a; Boatto, 
Barisan, 2014b). For instance, as couple of non-exhaustive examples, a group of producers 
integrates production from the stage of grape cultivation to that of final marketing at retail 
level. In other cases, producers purchase grapes from external suppliers, produce the wine 
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and sell it to final “bottlers” (imbottigliatori), who label the product with their brand and 
market it. In a third case, producers just bottle the wine and market it at wholesale and 
retail level. Production, very similar for technological characteristics and costs structures1, is 
carried on in different “institutions”, spanning from single firms to cooperative wineries 
(cantine sociali): from winegrowers, local firms of small dimensions, to large producers, 
facing international demand. 
The different governance structures are regulated by a nexus of very heterogeneous 
(formal and informal) contracts and rules. It emerges a heterogeneous institutional 
organization, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. The Organization of the Prosecco Market 
 
The apparent paradox sketches a whole world of negotiations and transactions 
aiming at producing a product with “similar” features and marketed at “similar” 
(average) prices (with some exceptions). The production of such “quasi-
homogeneous product is carried on in very different institutions. The objective of 
the present study, therefore, aims at analyzing and solving the “puzzle” of 
organizational governance structures of the Prosecco wine, by concentrating on the 
cooperative wineries2.  
                                                          
1  The technology of production is relatively inexpensive, characterized by constant marginal 
productivity of most inputs, and allows producers to market the product at low (average) prices. 
Prosecco is produced with the Charmat method, a less costly, alternative method to the more 
“famous” Champenoise procedure used for producing sparkling wines.  
2By the Italian law “A cooperative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet 
their economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through the creation of a company jointly 
owned and democratically controlled." The cooperative is a company formed by several people (at 
least 9, or 3 in the case of natural persons) that combine to satisfy a common need. It fails to 
distinguish the owner/employee because, in a cooperative, all members equally affect the choices of 
the company and the human element tends to prevail on the economic one (see Zamagni, 2010). 
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We adopt the framework of the economics of transaction costs (TCE), for which the 
existence of different institutions and governance structures depend on the different 
amount of costs that characterize a transaction/exchange. Williamson (1979) shows 
that asset specificity increases the uncertainty and complexity of the transaction, 
and therefore transaction costs. The higher asset specificity, the higher the 
uncertainty and complexity of the transactions, the lower the reliance on the 
(neoclassical) market mechanism, (that does not guarantee the minimization of 
transaction costs) and the higher the reliance on long-term contracts or other 
complex institutional structures. There are “costs of using the price mechanism” 
(Coase, 1937, p. 3), and the more complex the transaction the higher the price of 
the market mechanism. In this framework, we interpret cooperative wineries as 
transaction costs “adapting” governance structures. Cooperatives are organizations, 
in which the degree of specificity of investment and uncertainty in the exchange 
are not particularly high. The investment of the cooperative in relation to the 
pursuit of its mission is characterized by an average level of specificity, because 
though bound to the production of wine, it can turn into a business for profit or it 
can produce, with little investment other products (e.g. oil). The uncertainty of the 
production process is average/low because is mostly impacted by climatic conditions, 
which are not controllable by human remedies, and can only be mitigated or 
adapted. Demand for Prosecco is growing worldwide and this lowers the uncertainty 
in the exchange. The indicator complexity is low relative to the ability to identify 
with certainty the product offered, which is recognizable and well-regulated. The 
regulation of relations between members, the mutual purpose, and in general all that 
nexus regulating the relations of human capital, present the most important levels of 
complexity that might increase transaction costs. 
Although a complete literature review goes beyond the scope of this paper, in the 
context of agricultural economics, applying TCE to cooperative firms is a well-known 
approach that dates back to Cook (1995), who takes a property rights perspective to 
explain the cooperative structures. Our research follows that research stream and 
differentiates for the specific application to the Treviso wineries and for taking a 
different institutional approach, looking at the impact of regulation on economic 
performance of the cooperatives. The study, in fact, performs an economic analysis 
of the rules that govern the organization of production within cooperative wineries in 
the Treviso area, in order to assess the economic impact on the wineries 
performance and the ability of the institution to minimize transaction costs. The 
work is organized as follows: section 2 presents an economic discussion of 
qualitative and quantitative information gathered for the 16 cooperative wineries in 
the Treviso area. Section 3 presents a theoretical framework for the TCE of the 
cooperative wineries. Section 4 concludes. 
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Performance and Rules of the Prosecco Cooperative Wineries in the Treviso Area 
 
The paragraph presents an economic discussion of qualitative and quantitative 
information gathered with respect to the 16 cooperative wineries in the Treviso area. 
In order to find a relational link between rules and economic performance, we 
looked for: (1) the analysis of the winery Statues, (2) the analysis of the winery 
internal Regulations and finally (3) the analysis of the questionnaires submitted in 
order to get quantitative data on production key variables.  
The rules that govern the 16 cooperative wineries are very similar. The Statutes 
mostly regulate the objective, the shareholders rights, obligations and value of 
shares and the institutional governance, organization and decisional bodies and 
procedure. Statutes tend to homogenize their provisions to the common regulation 
provided by the law on cooperative firms in Italy, with few references to the specific 
case of the winery 3 . The internal Regulations contain key provisions for the 
organization of wine production and identify more clearly the nature and objectives 
of this particular form of enterprise. In particular, the Regulations set very stringent 
qualitative standards for the grapes the shareholders are allowed to confer. Those 
standards are stricter that the general standards required by the disciplinary. Table 1 
summarizes the main provisions of Statutes and Regulations and discusses the 
provisions in economic perspectives. 
The questionnaires were incompletely fulfilled, especially with regard to data on profits, 
cooperative costs and returns.  Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the available 
information, related to the production year-2013. 
In 2013, the 16 cooperative wineries in the Treviso area have produced a total of 2,224,567 
quintals of grapes. The individual contributions vary across wineries, according to their 
dimensions and it spans from a minimum of 10,004 to a maximum of 409,021 quintals, with 
an average of 158,898 per cooperative winery.  The liquidation price of the grapes shows a 
marked difference between the various wineries, which depends on the performance. The 
average price of liquidation of grapes equal 84.35 Euros per quintal, with a minimum of 70 
and a maximum of 128 depending on the winery. Meeting with experts has emphasized that 
the liquidation price is higher that the market price of grapes, that on average is around 






                                                          
3  The cooperative statutes are often standard forms, provided by associations and consultants.  They 
are customized only if necessary, to fit special cases. The common characteristics (mutuality, 
dividends, open membership.) are law requirements and/or requisites for tax advantages. Cooperative 
law requires specific stipulations in the statutes. 
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Table 1: Economic Analysis of the Cooperative Wineries Statutes and Regulations 
STATUTES 




All wineries reaffirm their mutual vocation, recalling it constantly in the Statutes. The 
distribution of dividends is limited and tied to the achievement of the mission. The three 
most important social objectives (mutual vocation, distribution of returns and dividends 
and cooperative winemaking) are regulated in much the same way in all the statutes. 
There are slight differences. As for the regulation of technical support services, for 
instance, not all wineries include such activity in the performance of the mutual activities. 
Provide technical assistance involves the benefit of coordination and strengthening of 
mutual concepts. Also it involves the cost of a potential loss in the event of erroneous or 
incomplete or inefficient care. The wineries that do not provide for technical assistance 
and leave the cooperative shareholder free to use their own professional reference , could 
greatly reduce the transaction costs related to the social responsibility of the company in 





The number of cooperative shareholders is unlimited, open, and consistent with the 
available 
organizational and technical possibilities of the cooperative winery. Since the cooperative 
is by juridical nature an “open entity”, if an applicant is eligible for admission under the 
law, then it cannot be ruled out. However, there exist a clear economic barrier to 
attracting new members and is represented by the achievement of maximum 
technological and production capacity of the cooperative 
Value of 
Shares 
In most Statues, "the share capital is variable and is divided into shares with a value of 
EUR 25.00," and "the number of shares of each shareholder is related to the amount of 
his grapes conferment." There was some exceptions: the value of the shares amounted to 
€ 50.00, for two wineries and amounted to EUR 200, eight times higher than the 
majority, for one. This latter differs greatly from the media because the cooperative is 
more recent than the others.  
Financier 
Shareholders 
Some cooperatives (75%) allow for the presence of investor members, whose 
contributions in 
cash  must  be  used  to  finance  development  plans  and  business  modernization.  
Those shareholders are bound for a period of time related to the realization of the 
plans. Statutes specify the value of the shares (spanning from 25 to 500 Euros), the 
minimum number of shares (spanning from 100 to 1500) and the type of contribution. 
The figure of financing member could be interpreted as a form of internalization 
alternative to external recourse to financial and capital markets, which often are volatile 
and risky. Companies deciding to enlarge the scale, rather than resorting to the 
external capital markets, internalize    entering capital through the 
creation of a legal entity (financier shareholder), which provides liquidity to fund it, 
through the purchase of shares.  
On the other hand, cooperative wineries that do not provide for funding members might 
be characterized by high efficiency in terms of transaction costs and production costs, 
such as not to require the placing of additional capital. 
Duration The Statutes specify the duration of the cooperative. The duration is mostly defined 
around 50 years for all cooperatives. In TCE perspective, the duration of a contract is a 
very important indicator that often reveals the degree of intensity of the three key 
variables that affect transaction costs and related governance. In this view, the rule that 
provides for a term of more decades could be interpreted as an efficient and effective 
attempt to minimize transaction costs generated by the complexity of organizing and 
coordinating all the relationships and activities inside the social cooperative. A long time 
horizon could also be interpreted as an incentive for the cooperative shareholders to the 
commitment to the mutual purpose. At the same time, the possibility of subsequent entry 
or exit accorded to shareholders is a renegotiation provision that provides flexible 
adaptation (in view of transaction costs minimization) to the long term agreement.  
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Table 1 (continues): Economic Analysis of the Cooperative Wineries Statutes and Regulations  
REGULATIONS 
Norm Economic Analysis 
Quality of the 
grape 
conferment 
There is a great deal of attention to the quality of the grapes conferred even within 
cooperatives. 
The Regulations set disincentives and punishments (for the shareholders who do not 
deliver high quality grapes or do not respect schedules and procedures) that are more 
rigid than the General Disciplinary. For instance: 
 Grapes affected by different diseases, spoiled by climatic agents like hailstorm, mold, or 
dryness are not purchased by the cooperative. 
 Grapes must contain a precise (decided by the regulation) have the level of acidity 
respect the regulation norms on the level acidity and sugar content: 
 Grapes must be conferred in respect to the prescribed annual yields (and proportional to 
the land hectares) 
 The grapes harvest has to respect the timetable (day and hour) set by the cooperative. If 
this ' does not occur the grapes are not purchased by the cooperative. 
Controls can be visual and technical. The grapes that are not accepted for prime rate 
winemaking can be bargained upon, case by case, and purchased for other purposes. 
Those shareholders that present a temporal path of virtuous behavior (in terms of 




The regulations define the way to compute the liquidation price of grapes, (based on a 
series of parameters, the most important of which is the quality of the grapes). The 
liquidation price is the cost of the input-grape, and is higher than purchasing grapes in 
free market. But the difference with the cost of inputs purchased in the free market, 
should not be interpreted only in terms of lost efficiency but above all as gains and 
benefits in terms of social cohesion. 
Incentives and disincentives set in the Regulations aim at preserving the efficient 
organization of production. These provisions may be interpreted as a vocation to do 
business in an organized and effective way. 
 



















46,639 30,793 2,181 110,757 
 
The cooperative wineries pay a higher price for the input grapes. This might be interpreted 
as decrease in technological efficiency, recovered by an increase in X-efficiency, since 
shareholders are very motivated and bound to the mission of the cooperative. Most grapes 
are destined to the production of Prosecco4 wine, with an average 43.35% of conferment.  
The  rest  of  the  grapes  is  mostly  destined  to  the production of Pinot grigio. The 2013 
average production of Prosecco wine is 46,639 hl per winery, with a minimum of 2,181 
and a maximum of 110,757 hl, depending on the strategy and the dimension of the plant. It 
                                                          
4 Although Glera has been cultivated around the Conegliano and Valdobbiadene hills since the 18th 
century, more than 25,000 ha of Glera vineyards, and more than 350 million bottles are produced 
annually. Prosecco wine can be differentiated into Prosecco Controlled Denomination of Origin (CDO), 
and the Prosecco Controlled and Guaranteed Denomination of Origin (CGDO), depending on 
the geographical area where the grapes are cultivated.  
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is though worth noting that the 16 cooperative wineries on average supply 40% of the total 
Prosecco yearly production, where the firms in the province of Treviso produce 90% of 
total supply. 
 
Economics of the Cooperative Winery 
 
The scarcity of economic data and the homogeneity of regulation presented in section 2 has 
hampered the possibility to perform econometric analysis of the relationships among 
transaction costs, governance and economic performance5. However, the present section 
presents a simple framework in order to highlight and discuss the main relations and 
variables that synthesize the winery’s objective achievement through the setting of rules that 
(in our interpretation) are transaction costs minimizing. The cooperative winery’s objective is 
the maximization of the remuneration to the cooperative shareholders. In our framework, Rt,i 
represents the remuneration 
for each cooperative shareholder. They depend on the “transformation value”(valore di 
trasformazione), that is the profits derived from the sale of the wines produced and 
commercialized by the cooperative winery. In our framework the transformation value (TVw,t) 
is defined in Equation 1: 
 
(1)          ܶ ௪ܸǡ௧ ൌߨ௪ǡ௧ൣܳ௪ǡ௧ ǡ തܲ௪ǡ௧ǡ ܥ௪ǡ௧ሺߙǡ ܳ௚ǡ௧ିଵǡ ݌௚ǡ௧ିଵሻ൧ 
 
Where ߨ௪ǡ௧  are the profits generated from the sale of the wines produced and 
commercialized by the cooperative winery (w) at time t5. Profits depend on the quantity of 
wine produced and commercialized ܳ௪ǡ௧. Profits also depend on the vector of prices practiced 
by the winery for its wines തܲ௪ǡ௧  (with തܲ௪ǡ௧ ൌ ሺ ଵܲǡ ǥ ǡ ௡ܲሻ) and on the production costs ܥ௪ǡ௧. 
Production costs, in turn, depend on ܳ௚ǡ௧ିଵ (with ܳ௚ǡ௧ିଵ ൌ (ݍଵ ൅ݍଶǡ ൅ڮ൅ݍ௡ሻǡe.g. the total 
quantity of grapes is the sum of the grapes provided by each individual shareholder). ܳ௚ǡ௧ିଵ 
is the total quantity of grapes delivered by all cooperative shareholders in the period t -1, 
since the harvest is precedent to the  wine-making procedure. Total production costs also 
depend on the “liquidation price”݌௚ǡ௧ିଵ the price paid to the shareholder for the purchase of 
the grapes in the period t -1. 
The ߙ parameter represents the high qualitative standard of the grapes supplied by each   
cooperative shareholder. The ߙ parameter affects both the quantity accepted and bought by 
the cooperative winery and the purchase price, as explained afterwards. The ߙ  parameter 
                                                          
5 As one referee correctly points out, a key element in the model is the link between Qg at time t-1 
and the profits at time t. This means that profits today depend on grape quantity and prices of 
previous year. In many cooperatives this link is purposely attenuated using a system based on 
provisional down payments and final installment (anticipi in conto conferimento and saldi). Inventory 
evaluation (i.e., valutazione delle rimanenze) is also used to break the inter-temporal link. These 
practices determine accounting profits, not the economic one and are not embodied in the model, but 
it is important to mention them.  
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also affects the final profits, since a high qualitative standard of the grapes positively affects 
the quality of the produced wines, their price and marketability possibilities6.  
The liquidation price (ܮ ௧ܲǡ௜ሻ is the price paid by the winery for the grapes. It is the ratio 
between the transformation value in Eq. (1) and the total quantity of grapes (g) supplied by 
all cooperative shareholders ܳ௚ǡ௧ (with ܳ௚ǡ௧ = (ݍଵǡ ǥ ݍ௡ሻ, as described in Equation (2).  
 
(2)            ܮ ௧ܲǡ௜ = గೢǡ೟ൣொೢǡ೟ǡ௉തೢ ǡ೟ǡ஼ೢǡ೟ሺఈǡொ೒ǡ೟షభǡ௣೒ǡ೟షభሻ൧ொ೒ǡ೟  
 
Remunerations (ܴ௧ǡ௜ሻ  to each cooperative shareholder can be described by Equation (3). 
 
(3)         ܴ௧ǡ௜ ൌ గೢǡ೟ൣொೢǡ೟ǡ௉തೢ ǡ೟ǡ஼ೢǡ೟ሺఈǡொ೒ǡ೟షభǡ௣೒ǡ೟షభሻ൧ொ೒ǡ೟ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥǤ ݍ௚ǡ௧ǡ௜ሺߙሻ௅௜௤௨௜ௗ௔௧௜௢௡௣௥௜௖௘௢௙௧௛௘௚௥௔௣௘௦௦௨௣௣௟௜௘ௗ௕௬௘௔௖௛௖௢௢௣௘௥௔௧௜௩௘௦௛௔௥௘௛௢௟ௗ௘௥௜ 
 
The annual remuneration ܴ௧ǡ௜of each cooperative shareholder i at time t depends on the 
liquidation price of the grapes (as defined in equations (1) and (2)); on the cooperative 
shareholder’s grapes that the winery is willing to purchase ୥ǡ୲ǡ୧and again on the quality 
parameter Ƚ. It is important to highlight that the supplied total quantity at the denominator 
also depends on the Ƚ parameter, since it is a sum of individual shareholder’s conferment. 
Quality matters in the selection and purchase of grapes from single shareholders.  
Equation (3) shows and summarizes the choice of the cooperative wineries (and each 
cooperative shareholder) and the mutualistic nature of the firm. In fact, remunerations 
increase when the (previous year) profits of the cooperative winery increase and when the 
quantity of supplied grapes (by each cooperative shareholder) increases. Remunerations 
decrease when the total quantity supplied by all cooperative shareholders increases. 
Remunerations may also increase or decrease according to the quality of the supplied 
grapes, as measured by the α parameter. This not only affects the present computation of 
remunerations at time t, via the qualitative assessment of the cooperative shareholders 
individual and total supplied grapes, but is also affected by the performance of the 
cooperative winery in the previous period t-1. The quality of the supplied grapes at t-1 is a 
variable that enters the production costs and affects the performance of the winery, since 
the high qualitative standard of the grapes contributes to positively affect the quality of the 
produced wine. The better is the wine, the better the winery performance, the higher the 
profits, and therefore, the returns for each cooperative shareholder. 
The formulation described in Equation (3), though algebraic simple, is very effective in its 
economic interpretation. There is a clear interdependence between the performance of the 
                                                          
6 In the paper the quality parameter α is treated as exogenous, since the outcome of the problem is, 
by authorial choice, only the optimal quantity of grapes, purchased from each single shareholder by 
the cooperative winery that is required to maximize the remuneration to the cooperative shareholders. 
The criteria to assess the quality of grapes are legally defined (at various levels) and predetermined 
with respect to the moment when the grapes are purchased. They are mostly time and criteria 
invariant, since to change the criteria, the cooperative should change several internal regulations 
through various legal procedures. The quality parameter affects, though, the purchased quantity, and 
in turn affects the remuneration to the shareholders. 
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cooperative winery and performance of the single cooperative shareholder. They all depend 
on the qualitative features of the supplied grapes; on the economic performance in terms of 
profits of the previous considered period and on the total quantity supplied by all 
shareholders.  
For the sake of simplicity, we can rewrite Eq. (3) as follows: 
 
(4)                 ܴ௧ǡ௜ ൌ ܮ ௚ܲǡ௧ǡ௜ Ǥ ݍ௚ǡ௧ǡ௜ሺߙሻ 
 
where ܮ ௚ܲǡ௧ǡ௜ is the liquidation price as defined in Equation (2).  
Taking first order derivative with respect to the key choice variable Qg,t, allows to better 
capture the interrelation between the mutualistic and for profit objectives of the cooperative 
winey on the other.  
 
(5)    
డோ೟ǡ೔డொ೒ǡ೟ = గೢǡ೟ൣொೢǡ೟ǡ௉തೢ ǡ೟ǡ஼ೢǡ೟ሺఈǡொ೒ǡ೟షభǡ௣೒ǡ೟షభሻ൧ொ೒ǡ೟మ  = ௏ ೟்షభொ೒ǡ೟మ  
 
Equation (5) has the form of a hyperbolic function. The differential for the transformation 
value is treated as a constant since it is realized and predetermined in the previous period. It 
is though important to highlight that the amount of that value depends on the performance 
in the Prosecco wine market expressed by positive profits, which in turn also depend on the 
quantity and quality of grapes supplied by each cooperative shareholder in the previous 
period t- 1. A marginal increase in total quantity increases marginal remunerations less than 
proportionally. This marginal impact corroborates the idea that cooperative wineries have a 
mutualistic objective with a view to the profits and the markets. In fact, the total quantity 
equals the (weighted by ߙ ) sum of the quantity of grapes supplied by each individual 
cooperative shareholder, with Qg,t,  = [ ሺߙሻݍଵ ൅ሺߙሻݍଶ ൅ڮ൅ሺߙሻݍ௡ሻ ]. Total quantity 
depends on the individual supply that is somehow rationed and controlled for quality of the 
grapes, through strict procedures and rules established by the winery internal regulations. 
Controlling for quality is an indirect way to rationing supplied quantity as an efficient way to 
maximize remunerations in two directions. First, a good quality of the grapes allows to 
producing a better wine. This in turn is translated into a higher probability to market the 
wines and, therefore, to earn higher profits. Second, linking the returns of individual 
cooperative shareholders to a quality assessment of the grapes they supply to the 
cooperative winery generates incentives to overcome moral hazard, to increase X-efficiency 
and to strengthen the mutualistic purpose. Those shareholders that do not provide grapes 
with high qualitative standards are “punished” in terms of present and future payoffs, since a 
bad quality of the grapes might negatively affect the future performance of the whole winery 
at time t+ 1. In this perspective we can find a strong link between rules on quality standards 
and impacts on the winery economic performance and interpret it as transaction costs 
minimizing. 
Finally, Table 3 shows results of correlation analysis among selected variables, in order to 
provide the model with some sort of “empirical” testing. 
We found, among other results, a low correlation coefficient (-0.20) for the relationship 
between total quantity and liquidation price. This signals a weak relational interdependence 
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and might be interpreted at the light of our theoretical framework. The liquidation price, in 
fact, is not determined through strict market criteria and strongly incorporates valuations 
(i.e. he α parameter) that are not computed in the correlation matrix and depend on 
regulations of quality. Such coefficient is negative. This implies a “movement” of the two 
selected variables in opposite directions, as expected by the theory. 
 
Table 3: Correlation analysis. 




%     of     
Prosecco 







1.00    
Liquidation Price 
(Euros) 
-0.20 1.00   
% of Prosecco 
Grapes over the 
total conferred 
-0.42 -0.096 1.00  
Prosecco Wine 
(hectoliters) 





The paper has analyzed the link between economic performance, rules and governance in 
the cooperative wineries operating in the Treviso area, with a view to the Prosecco 
production. Despite the “fame” of the cooperative winery of an inefficient, assistance-based 
institution, it emerges the profile of a complex structure, which seeks to incorporate the 
values of social and cultural cohesion and competitiveness in the markets, within the mission 
of a company. Social cohesion emerges in an attempt to provide a steady income to 
cooperative shareholders (by purchasing the grapes produced by shareholders). The 
long-term stability of income to the cooperative members aims to minimizing the risks and 
volatility of the exchange in free markets. In addition, social cohesion involves the 
strengthening of territorial belonging and sharing, including relationships with local 
institutions. Despite the mutual purpose, however, it emerged is a clear willingness of the 
cooperative winery to implement a strategy that valorizes the quality of the input, even at 
the costs of the punishment of the individual shareholder, that deviates from the required 
standard. The quality parameter α, defined in the simple framework in section 3, is fully 
implemented by the internal regulation. There is a strong link between regulation of quality 
standards and impacts on the winery economic performance. In the case of the winery, 
achieving mutualism is paradoxically favored by the maximization of profits and the ability 
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